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CAVEAT EMPTOR: HOW CAFTA IMPERILS STATE
RECYCLED PAPER PROCUREMENT PREFERENCES
Ben Stafford
Abstract: The federal government's use of its control over foreign commerce increasingly
conflicts with powers reserved to the states. Article 9 of the Central American Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA) establishes requirements by which government agencies must abide in
procuring goods and services. Specifically, CAFTA Article 9 establishes that procuring
entities must afford "national treatment" to goods imported from other CAFTA nations by
treating such foreign goods at least as favorably as similar domestic goods. The federal
government reached an agreement wherein a number of states became bound by these rules,
including fourteen states with state statutes related to governmental procurement preferences
for recycled paper. This Comment argues that three of these state statutes violate CAFTA by
requiring that procuring governmental entities give preference to local recycled paper
products over their foreign recycled and virgin paper counterparts. Such a violation places
the United States in breach of treaty. Accordingly, these states must modify their laws to
bring them into compliance with CAFTA or risk federal preemption or targeted trade
sanctions.

On March 6, 2006, the Washington State Legislature unanimously
passed Senate Joint Memorial 8019.1 The Legislature addressed the
Memorial to President Bush, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House, and the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). 2 The Memorial
calls for the establishment of a Federal-State International Trade Policy
Commission to coordinate communication between federal and state
trade policy officials. According to the Washington State Legislature,
the establishment of such a Commission has become necessary due to
recent international trade agreements entered into by the U.S.
government, which "have proceeded beyond discussion of tariffs and
quotas and now address government regulation, taxation, procurement,
and economic development policies that are implemented at state and
local levels."4
1. See I Legislative Digest and History of Bills of the Senate and House of Representatives, 59th
Leg., Reg. Sess., at 551-52 (Wash. 2006).
2. See E.S.J. Memorial 8019, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006). The USTR is a member of the
President's Cabinet and serves as the "[P]resident's principal trade advisor, negotiator, and
spokesperson on trade issues." See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Mission of the USTR,
http://www.ustr.gov/Who-WeAre/Mission_of theUSTR.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2006).
3. E.S.J. Memorial 8019.
4. Id.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 82:175, 2007

As set forth in Joint Memorial 8019, free trade agreements, which are
the province of the federal government, are increasingly reaching the
core functions of state governments.5 Among other issues, this has
dramatic implications for the ability of state governments to use their
purchasing power to advance local economic development and
environmental policy. 6 The potential scope of conflict is expanding
rapidly with the recent proliferation of bilateral and multilateral free
trade agreements between the United States and other nations.' These
agreements are allowable exceptions to the general vision of the World8
Trade Organization (WTO) as an overarching global trade system.
States must therefore be cognizant not only of WTO rules and ongoing
WTO developments, but also of a series of side trade agreements and
negotiations.
Government procurement practices can dramatically shape markets,
social development, and environmental protection 9 because government
expenditures constitute a large percentage of gross domestic product in
most industrialized nations.' ° This power has led many governments to
use procurement to advance sustainable development." Free trade
agreements entered into by the2 federal government increasingly affect
state government procurement.'
5. See infra Part I.B.
6. See, e.g., Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement art. 9,
Aug. 5, 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/
Section lndex.html [hereinafter CAFTA] (requiring state agencies to abide by procurement rules).
7. See,
e.g.,
Office
of the
U.S. Trade
Representative,
Trade
Agreements,
http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Section-Index.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2007) (listing recent
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements).
8. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, art. XXIV, 5, Legal Instruments-Results
of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter GATT] (authorizing formation of
"customs unions" and "free-trade areas").
9. See Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Sustainable Development in the Negotiation of the FTAA,
27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1118, 1195 (2004).
10. Government procurement constitutes ten to twenty-five percent of Gross Domestic Product
for member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). See
id. The OECD includes most of the world's largest economies. See OECD, THE OECD 29 (2006),
http://www.oecd.org/document/1 8/0,2340,en_2649_201185_2068050_1l1_1_1,00.html
(follow
"pdf version of our brochure" hyperlink).
11. See Cordonier Segger, supra note 9, at 1195.
12. See, e.g., CAFTA Annex 9.1.2(b)(i) § B Schedule of the United States & Notes to the
Schedule of the United States, Aug. 5, 2004, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/
Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/assetuploadfile977_3927.pdf
[hereinafter CAFTA
U.S. Schedule & CAFTA U.S. Schedule Notes] (covering procurement of twenty-two states).

State Procurement Laws Under CAFTA
The Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) is a recent
example of this new breed of trade agreement.1 3 CAFTA requires that
government procurers, including states, afford "national treatment" to
other CAFTA members by treating foreign goods no less favorably than
similar domestic goods.14 CAFTA also, however, provides limited
environmental exceptions to the national treatment requirement.1 5
This Comment argues that the procurement laws of Arkansas,
Louisiana, and New York, which give preference to recycled paper over
virgin paper, violate the national treatment rules of CAFTA, fail to
qualify for any of CAFTA's environmental exceptions, and place the
United States in breach of that treaty. Part I explains the place of trade
treaties in our federal system of government. Part II provides
information about the history and structure of the WTO and CAFTA.
Part III examines the national treatment principles of the WTO, which
CAFTA incorporates. Part IV discusses the limited environmental
exceptions of CAFTA that potentially excuse otherwise non-compliant
laws. Part V examines the recycled paper procurement laws of the
fourteen states bound by CAFTA's government procurement rules. Part
VI argues that three states' recycled paper procurement laws violate the
national treatment rules of CAFTA.
I.

THE CONSTITUTION VESTS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
WITH NEAR-PLENARY FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS

Under the federal system of the United States, control of foreign
affairs rests with the federal government. 16 The federal government
exercises control over foreign commerce primarily through the use of
treaties and other international agreements. 17 These agreements
increasingly reach the core functions of state governments.1 8 Although
states are insulated from direct action for treaty violations, the federal
government faces consequences for a state's breach.1 9

13. See CAFTA, supra note 6.

14. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 3.2; see also infra Part III.B.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part I.A.
17. See infra Part I.A.
18. See infra Part I.B.
19. See infra Part I.C.
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The Federal Government Plays the DominantRole in Foreign
Affairs

States play a minor role in foreign affairs because the federal
government has near-plenary power over the foreign relations of the
United States.20 The U.S. Constitution prohibits states from performing

numerous foreign relations functions, including entering into treaties
with foreign nations.2 ' Instead, the Constitution gives the President
exclusive authority to enter into treaties with the concurrence of twothirds of the Senate. Moreover, Congress has the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations., 23 The United States thus conducts
foreign commerce through a framework of treaties and other
international agreements negotiated at the federal level2 4
B.

Trade Treaties IncreasinglyReach the Core Functions of State
Governments

Modem trade treaties increasingly impact the regulatory authority of
state governments. 25 Foreign affairs and international trade posed little
danger to state sovereignty until the emergence of the General
Agreement on Trades and Tariffs2 6 in the post-World War II era2 7 and its

subsequent transformation into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
1995.28 In addition to U.S. membership in the WTO, the administration
20. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) ("Our system of government is such
that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no less than the interest of the people of the whole
nation, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign relations be left
entirely free from local interference."). However, in the race for economic betterment, states have
expanded their international role by, for example, establishing trade programs and seeking out
foreign investment. See Barry Friedman, Federalism'sFuture in the Global Village, 47 VAND. L.
REv. 1441, 1459 (1994).
21. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
22. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
23. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
24. See Kenneth M. Casebeer, The Power to Regulate "Commerce with Foreign Nations" in a
Global Economy and the Future of American Democracy: An Essay, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 25, 33
(2001).
25. See Friedman, supra note 20, at 1453-59.
26. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A- 1l, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. The
Agreement subsequently underwent significant amendment, culminating in the creation of the WTO
in 1994, when the parties adopted the current version of the Agreement. See GATT, supra note 8.
27. See Friedman, supra note 21, at 1454.
28. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144 (1994). Federal control over foreign affairs
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of George W. Bush actively expanded the participation of the United
States in other bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements.2 9 The
scope of trade agreements has increased dramatically since the creation
of the WTO and now reaches areas as diverse as services,3 ° intellectual
property, 3 1 and government procurement. 32 While in the past the
obligations of trade agreements applied only to the national level of
government in federalist nations, many free trade agreements now also
apply to subnational units. 33 States are thus increasingly affected by
international trade agreements.34
C.

Foreign Nations May Not Sue States Directlyfor Treaty Violations,
but Must Instead Rely on FederalPreemptionand International
Dispute Settlement Bodies

States, as subnational units, are largely insulated from direct
consequences for treaty violations. Foreign nations may obtain relief for
such violations through a federal declaratory action brought to preempt

threatens state sovereignty because treaties trump state law. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("[A]II
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land .... ).
29. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2006 TRADE POLICY AGENDA AND
2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS

PROGRAM 114-123 (2006), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/ReportsPublications/
2006/2006_TradePolicyAgenda/assetupload file765_9077.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2007) (listing
recent bilateral trade agreements).
30. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay
Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1167 (1994).
31. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Legal InstrumentsResults ofthe Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994).
32. See Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay
Round, 1915 U.N.T.S. 103. Prior to GATT, such international trade agreements generally were
limited in scope because they dealt primarily with tariffs and excluded such significant sectors as
services and procurement. See Friedman, supra note 20, at 1454-55 (noting that prior to 1994 most
GATT negotiations concerned trade in goods, and "state authority was involved little and remained
reasonably intact"); see also INFO. & MEDIA RELATIONS DIV., WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 16 (3d ed. 2003) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING THE WTO].
33. See, e.g., CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 3.2(2) (applying national treatment rules to subnational
governments).
34. See, e.g., Report of the Panel, United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt
Beverages, 6.1, DS23/R (June 19, 1992), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 206, 297-99 (1993)
(GATT Panel ruling that various taxes and regulations of numerous states violated GATT).
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the offending state law 35 or international trade tribunals.36 Foreign
nations cannot sue individual U.S. states.37 Instead, nations seeking
redress against U.S. state actions must either spur federal preemption of
the state law 38 or lodge a complaint before the appropriate international
dispute settlement body.39 If such an international dispute settlement
body finds against the United States, and the U.S. government does not
act to eliminate the nonconforming state law, the tribunal may authorize
use of retaliatory trade sanctions against the United States to provoke
elimination of the offending law.40 Using such trade sanctions, the
aggrieved nation(s) may selectively target an offending state's products
to disrupt that state's economy.4 '
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council42 provides perhaps the
most well-known example of a state running afoul of the federal
government's foreign-affairs powers. Crosby addressed a government

35. Under the U.S. legislation implementing CAFTA, only a declaratory action brought by the
federal government can invalidate a state law on the basis that it is inconsistent with CAFTA. 19
U.S.C.A. § 4012(b)(1) (West 2005).
36. See, e.g., Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, art. 2.1,
Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]
(granting the WTO Dispute Settlement Body authority to adjudicate disputes arising out of certain
covered agreements).
37. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 4012(c) ("No person other than the United States... may challenge, in any
action brought under any provision of law, any action or inaction by any department, agency, or
other instrumentality of the United States, any State, or any political subdivision of a State, on the
ground that such action or inaction is inconsistent with [CAFTA].").
38. Federal statutes may preempt conflicting state laws on the subject of foreign affairs. See, e.g.,
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000) (holding that a Massachusetts law
targeting Burma was preempted because it interfered with Congress's approach to the same issue);
see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 60, 74 (1941) (holding a Pennsylvania act was
preempted by a conflicting federal act).
39. See, e.g., DSU, supra note 36, art 2.1 (stating that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
administers disputes arising out of covered WTO agreements). Nations cannot bring U.S. states
before a dispute settlement body directly because the federal government is the relevant
international actor. See Casebeer, supra note 24, at 33.
40. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 20.16(2) (authorizing such sanctions).
41. See David I. Spector, Note, Trade Treaty Threats and Sub-NationalSovereignty: Multilateral
Trade Treaties and Their Negligible Impact on State Laws, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
367, 385-87 (2005); see also John Simons, Handbags, Bed Linens Included in List of Goods
Covered by Trade Sanctions, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 1999, at A24 (reporting on "banana dispute"
between the United States and the European Union, during which the United States selectively
levied trade sanctions against products of certain European nations).
42. 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
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procurement law 43 enacted by Massachusetts in response to human rights

violations perpetrated by the government of Burma (now Myanmar). 4
Save for a few narrow exceptions, the law prohibited state agencies from
procuring goods and services from those doing business with Burma.4 5
In response to the law's enactment, the European Union and Japan
lodged formal complaints against the United States with the WTO.46
Before the WTO ruled on the offending law, the U.S. Supreme Court
48
47
determined that a federal law preempted the Massachusetts law.
While the Massachusetts law flatly prohibited state entities from buying
goods or services from any person doing business with Burma,49 the
federal law vested authority in the President to devise the appropriate
national level of economic sanction against Burma. 50 The Court found
that the Massachusetts law was preempted because the Massachusetts
law conflicted with the federal statute's delegation of authority to the
President to devise flexible sanctions.51
II.

THE WTO GOVERNS INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
PERMITS REGIONAL AGREEMENTS SUCH AS CAFTA

The WTO provides a set of substantive trading rules and serves as a
dispute settlement body for purported violations of these rules. 52 The
decisions of WTO tribunals create de facto precedent often followed by
later WTO tribunals adjudicating trade disputes.5 3 The WTO also allows
regional side agreements such as CAFTA.54 During CAFTA
negotiations, twenty-two U.S. states agreed to apply Article 9 of CAFTA
43. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 7, §§ 22G-22M (LexisNexis Supp. 1998), invalidatedby Crosby,
530 U.S. 363.
44. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 376-77.
45. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 7, §§ 22H-22J; see also Crosby, 530 U.S. at 367.

46. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 383.
47. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-121, 166-67 (1997).
48. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388.
49. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 7, §§ 22H-22J; see also Crosby, 530 U.S. at 367-68.
50. See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act § 570;

see also Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374-76.
51. See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 388.
52. See UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 32, at 9-10.
53. See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
(Oct. 4, 1996).
54. See GATT, supra note 8, art. XXIV,

5.

5.6, WT/DS8/AB/R
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to their government procurement practices. 55 Only a declaratory action
brought by the federal government can invalidate state law as a violation
of CAFTA, 56 although CAFTA tribunals may authorize trade sanctions
designed to force a state to change laws that do not conform with
CAFTA.57
A.

The WTO CreatesDe Facto PrecedentThrough Its DisputeResolution System

GATT members formed the WTO in 1995.58 The WTO serves three
overarching purposes. First, it is a forum for trade negotiations among
nations. 59 Second, it is a set of international trade rules developed
through a series of agreements and treaties. 60 The WTO framework
specifically authorizes its members to enter into regional trade
agreements such as CAFTA. 61 Third, the WTO serves as an arbiter to
resolve disputes arising under the organization's: agreements. 62
If two WTO members cannot resolve a dispute collaboratively, the
WTO's dispute-resolution system allows either party to ask for an expert
panel to adjudicate the dispute.63 If the panel determines that a WTO
agreement or obligation has been violated by a member's laws, it will
recommend that the offending party either revise or eliminate the
challenged measure to conform with WTO rules.64 Either party may
appeal a panel decision to the WTO Appellate Body.65 The WTO
Dispute Settlement Body, composed of all WTO members, has the
ultimate authority to accept or reject a panel report or an Appellate Body
decision. 66 Although the Dispute Settlement Body favors resolving
55. See CAFTA U.S. Schedule, supra note 12; see also infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
56. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 4012(b)(1) (West 2005).
57. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 20.16(2).
58. See UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 32, at 10.
59. See UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supranote 32, at 9.
60. See UNDERSTANDING THE VTO, supranote 32, at 9.

61. See GATT, supra note 8, art. XXIV, 5.
62. See UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supranote 32, at 10.
63. See UNDERSTANDING THE VITO, supranote 32, at 56.
64. See DSU, supra note 36, art. 19.1.
65. See DSU, supra note 36, art. 16.4. The Appellate Body is a standing body of seven persons
who are appointed for four-year terms. See DSU, supra note 36, art. 17.1-.2. They must be experts
in international law who are unaffiliated with any government. See DSU, supranote 36, art. 17.3.
66. See UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 32, at 56-57. In practice, panel reports and
Appellate Body decisions are almost always adopted because rejection requires unanimous
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disputes through consultations, 67 it possesses the power to recommend
that countries cure laws inconsistent with the WTO. 68 Nations that do
not correct such laws may face trade sanctions.6 9
Decisions of either a WTO panel or the WTO Appellate Body do not
officially bind later panels or the Appellate Body; rather, such decisions
bind only the parties to the dispute. 70 Nonetheless, WTO decisions are
highly persuasive 71 and their legal reasoning is generally followed by
subsequent WTO tribunals.72 Accordingly, the decisions of WTO
tribunals create an emerging body of WTO jurisprudence.
B.

CAFTA Covers Government Procurementand Has a Dispute
Settlement Body with the Power to Demand Elimination of NonConforming State Laws

CAFTA is a regional free trade agreement among the United States,
the Dominican Republic, and five Central American countries.73
Twenty-two U.S. states have agreed to apply CAFTA, which
incorporates WTO national treatment rules, 74 to their government
procurement practices.7 5 In the United States, the legislation

consensus. See id. at 56. WTO tribunal reports do not bind the disputants until adopted by the
Dispute Settlement Body. See id. at 56-57.
67. See UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 32, at 55. "Consultations" are the collaborative,
interactive methods by which nations seek to resolve disputes. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 335
(8th ed. 2004).
68. See DSU, supra note 36, art. 19.1.
69. See DSU, supra note 36, art. 22.2.
70. See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 1 5.6, WT/DS8/AB/R
(Oct. 4, 1996).
71. See id. ("Adopted panel reports are .... often considered by subsequent panels. They create
legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where
they are relevant to any dispute.").
72. See id.18.5.
73. On August 5, 2004, the United States, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua signed CAFTA. See 19 U.S.C.A. §4011 (a)(1) (West 2005).
CAFTA has entered into force in the United States, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. See
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement of USTR Portman Regarding
Entry into Force of the U.S. - Central America - Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement
(CAFTA-DR) for Honduras and Nicaragua (Mar. 31, 2006), http://www.ustr.gov/
Document-Library/Press-Releases/2006/March/Statement-of-lUSTR-Portman-Regarding-EntryIntoForce of theUS - CentralAmerica_-_Dominican_RepublicFree..Trade.Agreement
_(CA.html.
74. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 3.2(2).
75. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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implementing CAFTA provides that only a declaratory action brought
by the federal government can preempt a state law inconsistent with
CAFTA. 76 Nevertheless, CAFTA tribunals can authorize retaliatory
sanctions against the United States for state non-compliance with
CAFTA. 7

1.

Twenty-Two U.S. States Agreed To Be Bound by CAFTA
Government ProcurementRules and Thus by WTO National
Treatment Rules

CAFTA regulates government procurement, which it defines as "the
process by which a government obtains the use of or acquires goods or
services, or any combination thereof, for governmental purposes. ' 78
Article 9 of the Agreement delineates member obligations related to
government procurement.79 In addition, CAFTA incorporates WTO
national treatment requirements.8 °
During CAFTA negotiations, the USTR sent a letter to the governors
of various states asking that they bind their states to follow CAFTA
procurement rules. 81 The governors of twenty-two U.S. states agreed 82 to
do so in relation to Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Nicaragua. 83 Sixteen of those states also chose to follow

76. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 4012(b)(1).
77. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 20.16.
78. See CAFTA, supranote 6, art. 2.1.
79. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 9.
80. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 3.2.
81. See, e.g., Letter from Gary Locke, Governor, State of Washington, to Robert B. Zoellick, U.S.
Trade Representative (Sept. 30, 2003), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
WA%20_LocketoUSTR.pdf (agreeing to cover Washington State procurement under CAFTA);
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, The Dominican Republic - Central America - United
States Free Trade Agreement - Impact on State and Local Governments 3,
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/Transmittal/asset-upload-fiIe242_
7825.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2007) (noting in this transmittal to Congress that the USTR had
requested that every state bind state government procurement under CAFTA).
82. Whether this process is constitutional under various state constitutions is hotly debated.
Which state governmental branch has constitutional authority to bind states to international trade
agreements is almost always unclear. See, e.g., TRACEY TAYLOR, WASH. STATE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THE LEGISLATURE, THE GOVERNOR & INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS:
AN ANALYSIS OF WASHINGTON LAW 2 (2004), http://wwwl.leg.wa.gov/documents/OPR/2005/
JLOCTP.pdf (concluding that the Washington State Constitution does not clearly delegate the
power to enter trade agreements to either the Governor or the Legislature).
83. See CAFTA U.S. Schedule, supra note 12.
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such rules in relation to Honduras.84 Moreover, each state designated
which of its agencies would be covered by CAFTA, 85 and each also
exempted certain industries from CAFTA, such as construction services,
software, and motor vehicles.86 Each CAFTA member designated which,
if any, subnational levels of its government would be bound by CAFTA
procurement rules. 7 The specific procuring entities of each member
bound by Article 9 rules appear in Annex 9.1.2(b)(i). 8
2.

CAFTA Panels Can Authorize Trade Sanctions, but Only a Federal
DeclaratoryAction Can Invalidate State Laws that Violate CAFTA

Only a declaratory action brought by the federal government in a U.S.
court can invalidate a state law for violating CAFTA. 89 An offended
nation may not bring a lawsuit directly against an offending U.S. state. 90
However, if the federal government fails to bring such a declaratory
action, a CAFTA panel is empowered to authorize other remedies. 91
CAFTA panels have jurisdiction over, inter alia, any CAFTA member's
claim that the law of another member has nullified or impaired its
expected benefits under CAFTA.92 If a panel finds for the complaining
member, it must initially recommend that the offending party eliminate
or modify the law in question.9 3 If the parties cannot agree on an
appropriate resolution, a panel may authorize the prevailing party to levy
retaliatory sanctions or monetary penalties. 94 However, CAFTA Article

84. See CAFTA U.S. Schedule, supra note 12.
85. See CAFTA U.S. Schedule, supra note 12.
86. See CAFTA U.S. Schedule, supranote 12.
87. CAFTA, supra note 6, Annex 9.1.2(b)(i).
88. See, e.g., CAFTA U.S. Schedule, supra note 12 (listing U.S. state procuring agencies bound
under CAFTA).
89. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 4012(b)(1) (West 2005) ("No State law, or the application thereof, may be
declared invalid ... on the ground that the provision or application is inconsistent with [CAFTA]
except in an action brought by the United States for the purpose of declaring such law or application
invalid.").

90. Id. § 4012(c)(2) ("No person other than the United States... may challenge ... any action or
inaction by any... State... on the ground that such action or inaction is inconsistent with
[CAFTA].").
91. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 20.15-16.
92. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 20.2(c).
93. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 20.15(2).
94. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 20.16(2).
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20.16 requires a prevailing nation, whenever possible, to limit95retaliatory
sanctions to the "same sector" affected by the challenged law.
III.

GATT AND CAFTA NON-DISCRIMINATION RULES
REQUIRE THAT LIKE PRODUCTS BE TREATED EQUALLY

"National treatment" rules of both the WTO and CAFTA promote the
goal of creating competitive trading relationships among nations 96 and
ensure that foreign products are treated as favorably as similar domestic
products. 97 National treatment thus minimizes a government's ability to
use procurement policy either to discriminate against the products of
another country or to force another country to adopt its labor,
environmental, or other standards in order to compete in its markets. 98
A.

WTO Members Must Afford National Treatment to the Products of
Other Members That Are "Like" Similar Domestic Products

WTO members owe a broad duty to give "national treatment" to
products of other nations. 99 Specifically, national treatment forbids
member states from applying internal measures' 00 to imported or
domestic products where the effect is to afford protection to domestic
production.' 0 ' GATT Article III contains the primary national treatment
requirements. 102
GATT Article III, Paragraph 2 (Paragraph 2) forbids a member state
03
from taxing imported products in excess of similar domestic products.1
The degree of similarity between two products determines the specific

95. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 20.16(5).
96. See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,

6.3, WT/DS8/AB/R

(Oct. 4, 1996).
97. GATT, supra note 8, art. Ill.
98. See Arthur E. Appleton, Environmental Labelling Schemes: WTO Law and Developing
Country Implications, in TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE MILLENNIUM 195, 199 (Gary P. Sampson

& W. Bradnee Chambers eds., 2000).
99. See GATT, supra note 8, art. 11.

100. Internal measures are those applied to imported products that have already entered a nation's
internal markets. See GATT, supra note 8, art. III. A different regime governs border measures. See,
e.g., GATT, supra note 8, art. VII (governing customs valuation).
101. See GATT, supra note 8, art. Ill.
102. See GATT, supra note 8, art. III.
103. See GATT, supra note 8, art. Il, 12.
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requirements with which a member state's taxation regime must
comply. 10 4 Specifically, Paragraph 2 provides:

The products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be
subject ... to internal taxes ... in excess of those applied ... to

like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall
otherwise apply internal taxes.., to imported or domestic
products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in
paragraph 1.105

The first sentence of Paragraph 2 applies only to "like" domestic
products. 106 Whether two products are "like" is determined on a case-bycase basis; they need not be identical.10 7 The second sentence of
Paragraph 2 encompasses, in addition to "like" goods, the broader
category of "directly competitive" or "substitutable" goods. 10 8 Products
are directly competitive or substitutable when they are interchangeable,
as shown by evidence that consumers consider or could consider the two
products as alternative means of satisfying a particular need or taste. 10 9
Evidence of cross-price elasticity," 0 distribution of two products through
similar channels,111 and relevant changes in consumer consumption
patterns 112 all 13 provide strong evidence that products are
interchangeable. 1

104. See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxeson Alcoholic Beverages, 7 8.17, WT/DS8/AB/R
(Oct. 4, 1996).
105. GATT, supra note 8, art. Il1, 7 2.
106. See GATT, supra note 8, art. Ill,

2.

107. See Panel Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 7 6.21, WT/DS8/R (July 11,
1996); see also infra Part III.A.1.
108. See GATT, supra note 8, Annex 1, Ad Article 111,
2 ("A tax conforming to the
requirements of the first sentence of paragraph 2 would be considered to be inconsistent with the
provisions of the second sentence only in cases where competition was involved between ... the
taxed product and... a directly competitive or substitutable product which was not similarly
taxed."). The Addendum to Article 111, containing official interpretative notes to various GATT
provisions, is part of the original GATT agreement.
109. See Appellate Body Report, Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
WT/DS84/R (Jan. 18, 1999).

115, WT/DS75/AB/R,

110. See Panel Report, Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 7 7.43, WT/DS87/R, WT/DS110/R
(June 15, 1999) (discussing relationship between domestic spirits and foreign spirits).
11.

See id.

7.57.

112. See id. $ 7.24 ("[P]anels should look at evidence of trends and changes in consumption
pattems and make an assessment as to whether such trends and pattems lead to the conclusion that
the products in question are ... directly competitive or substitutable .....
113. See id. $$ 7.77-78.
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GATT Article III, Paragraph 4 (Paragraph 4) applies national
14
treatment rules to a member nation's internal laws and regulations.'
Paragraph 4 provides, in relevant part: "The products.., of any
contracting party ...shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than
that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws,
regulations and requirements .... Although the text of Paragraph 4
also addresses "like" products, the scope of the term in Paragraph 4 is
broader than that in Paragraph 2.' 16 The Appellate Body has given "like"
in Paragraph 4 a broader reading because Paragraph 4 must protect the
same interests as Paragraph 2, but omits Paragraph 2's broader category
of "directly substitutable or competitive" products. 1 7 However, it is
unclear whether the term "like" in Paragraph 4 is as broad as the
combination of the Paragraph 2 categories of "like" products and
"directly substitutable or competitive" products.118
A Paragraph 4 violation requires proof of three elements. 1 9 First, the
imported and domestic products at issue must be "like products" within
the meaning of the term as used in Paragraph 4.120 Second, the
objectionable measure must be a law, regulation, or requirement
affecting internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution, or use of a product.' 2' Third, the imported products must be
given less22 favorable treatment than that given to like domestic
products. 1
1.

WTO Panels Determine Whether Products Are "Like " on a Caseby-Case Basis by ExaminingFourFactors

When faced with an alleged violation of Paragraph 4, a WTO panel
determines whether imported and domestic products are "like" on a
114. See GATT, supra note 8, art. III,

4.

115. See GATT, supra note 8, art. 111, T4.
116. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-ContainingProducts, 99, WT/DS 135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).
117. See id.
118. Id. This ambiguity does not arise in CAFTA, which explicitly provides that national
treatment must be afforded to like, directly competitive, and directly substitutable goods. See
CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 3.2(2).
119. See Appellate Body Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and
Frozen Beef, 133, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DSI69/AB/R (Dec. 11,2000).
120. See GATT, supra note 8, art. III,

114.

121. See GATT, supra note 8, art. III,

4.

122. See GATT, supra note 8, art. III,

4.
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case-by-case basis.123 The Appellate Body has suggested that the
determining criterion by which to judge "likeness" under Paragraph 4 is
whether two products are in a competitive relationship with each
other.1 24 To make this determination, WTO panels examine four
nondispositive factors for each product: (1) the product's properties,
nature, and quality; (2) the product's end uses in a given market;
(3) consumers' tastes and habits, which may vary from country
to
25
country; and (4) the product's international tariff classification.
First, the criterion of properties, nature, and quality examines whether
the products share physical similarities that affect their
competitiveness.1 26 WTO jurisprudence suggests that "[t]he
determination of whether two products are 'like' has traditionally turned
' 27
to a great[] extent ...on the physical characteristics of products."'
Some panel decisions have indicated that the inquiry could largely end
here, stating that
"like" products are those sharing most physical
28
1
characteristics.
In addition, WTO panels apply the criteria of "end uses" and of
"consumer tastes and habits," which both examine facets of the
competitive relationships between two products. 129 The criterion of end
uses focuses on the extent to which products are capable of performing
the same, or similar, functions. 30 Similarly, WTO tribunals examine the
criterion of consumer tastes and habits to determine the extent to which
13
consumers are willing to use the products to perform these functions.'

123. See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,

8.4, WT/DS8/AB/R

(Oct. 4, 1996).
124. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-ContainingProducts, 99, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).
125. Id.

101.

126. See id.

114 ("Panels must examine fully the physical properties of products. In particular,

panels must examine those physical properties of products that are likely to influence the
competitive relationship between products in the marketplace.").
127. Panel Report, Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
(Sept. 17, 1998).

10.66, WT/DS75/R, WT/DS84/R

128. See Panel Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,

6.23, WT/DS8/R (July 11,

1996).
129. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and
Asbestos-ContainingProducts, 117, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12,2001).
130. Id.

131. Id.
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Finally, WTO panels sometimes examine whether the products at
issue share the same tariff classification. 32 Because sufficiently detailed
product tariff classifications can demonstrate what WTO members
consider "like," WTO panels have found33it helpful to consider tariff
classifications when determining likeness.1
2.

National Treatment Rules ForbidDistinguishingBetween Products
Based on How They Are Made

National treatment rules generally forbid differentiating between
products because of "processes and production methods" unrelated to
the product itself. 34 Whether products are "like" therefore depends on
an examination of the products themselves and not how they are
made. 1 35 For example, a product made by child labor may be "like" a
product made by adult labor. 136 Vodka is "like" the Japanese liquor
shochu because both are clear alcoholic beverages, even though they are
filtered differently. 137 Similarly, a GATT panel refused to distinguish
tuna on the basis that some tuna were caught with nets that38kill dolphins,
while others were caught using dolphin-friendly methods.

8.8-8.9,
132. See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
WT/DS8/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) ("A uniform tariff classification of products can be relevant in
determining what are 'like products'. If sufficiently detailed, tariff classification can be a helpful
sign of product similarity.").
133. See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, T 8.8, WT/DS8/AB/R
(Oct. 4, 1996).
134. These sorts of process and production methods (PPMs) are commonly called non-product
related PPMs. See Appleton, supra note 98, at 199. For an example of a national treatment rule
forbidding such PPMs see GATT, supra note 8, art. III.
135. See Appleton, supra note 98, at 199.
136. See Exec. Order No. 13,126, 3 C.F.R. 195, 197 (1999), reprinted in 41 U.S.C. § 35 (2000)
(banning federal procurement of products made using child labor, but exempting purchase from
members of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, supra note 32, which contains
national treatment rules forbidding such distinctions between "like" products).
137. See Panel Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 6.23, WT/DS8/R (July 11,
1996).
138. See Report of the Panel, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 5.15, DS21/R
(Sept. 3, 1991), GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155, 195 (1993).
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B.

CAFTA Article 3 Expressly Extends National Treatment Both to
"Like" Goods and to Directly Substitutable and Competitive
Goods

CAFTA explicitly requires governmental procurement entities to
follow national treatment rules. 139 CAFTA also incorporated WTO
national treatment rules mutadis mutandis14 into the agreement.
In
regard to U.S. states, Article 3.2(2) of CAFTA provides that a

subnational level of government must give treatment no less favorable
than the most favorable treatment it gives to any "like, directly
competitive, or substitutable
goods, as the case may be, of the Party of
142
which it forms a part."'
CAFTA Article 3.2(2) amalgamates Paragraphs 2 and 4 of GATT
Article 111.143 GATT Paragraph 2 applies to discriminatory taxation
against both "like" and "directly competitive or substitutable" goods,' 4
while GATT Paragraph 4 governs discriminatory laws, regulations, and
other measures against "like products.', 145 CAFTA's national treatment
rules, however, apply uniformly to "like," "directly competitive," and
"substitutable" goods. 146 Products are "directly competitive" or
"substitutable" when they are interchangeable. 47 Therefore, state
procurement laws implicate CAFTA if they discriminate against
48
interchangeable products. 1

139. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 9.2(1).
140. "All necessary changes having been made; with the necessary changes." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1044 (8th ed. 2004). The phrase is used to incorporate earlier treaties or agreements
into later ones. Cf id. (discussing contracts).
141. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 3.2(1) ("Each Party shall accord national treatment to the
goods of another Party in accordance with Article Ill of the GATT 1994, including its interpretive
notes, and to this end Article Ill of the GATT 1994 and its interpretative notes are incorporated into
and made part of this Agreement, mutadis mutandis.").
142. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 3.2(2).
143. See supra Part III.A.
144. See supra notes 103-08.
145. See supra notes 114-15.
146. Compare CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 3.2(2) with GATT, supra note 8, art, Ill,

2.

147. See Appellate Body Report, Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 115, WT/DS75/AB/R,
WT/DS84/R (Jan. 18, 1999); see also supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text. Because CAFTA
incorporated WTO national treatment rules, WTO reports interpreting GATT Article Ill also inform
analysis of CAFTA's national treatment rules.
148. See id. (discussing GATT, supra note 8, art. IIl,

2).
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CAFTA PROVIDES TWO ENVIRONMENTAL EXCEPTIONS
TO NATIONAL TREATMENT RULES

CAFTA includes two exceptions -from national treatment rules for
government procurement rules designed to benefit the environment. The
two exceptions created are measures "necessary... to protect plant
life"' 149 and measures that "promote the general environmental quality"
in a state. 150 However, a measure does not qualify for an exception if it
fails the chapeau,15 1 or preface, to CAFTA Article 9.14.152 A measure
fails that chapeau if CAFTA-consistent measures addressing the
53
environmental concern are available. 1
A.

CAFTA Excepts Measures "Necessary" to Protectthe
Environment ProvidedNo Less Restrictive Alternatives Are
Available

Article 9.14 begins with a chapeau nearly identical to that of GATT
Article XX, which governs similar WTO exceptions. 154 Like GATT
Article III, CAFTA incorporated GATT Article XX mutadis mutandis
into the agreement. 15 5 CAFTA Article 9.14 lists four exceptions that

149. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 9.14(1)(b).
150. See CAFTA U.S. Schedule Notes, supra note 12.
151. Chapeau literally means "hat" in French. MARGUERITE-MARIE DUBOIS, MODERN FRENCHENGLISH DICTIONARY 120-21 (1960). In international trade law, it refers to the introductory
paragraph of a section or article that modifies all items in a list of provisiois that follow after it. See
UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 32, at 67.
152. Cf Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, 147, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (discussing identical GATT chapeau).
153. Cf Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, 157, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (discussing chapeau to equivalent WTO
exceptions).
154. Compare CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 9.14(1) ("Provided that such measures are not applied
in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
Parties where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on trade between the Parties,
nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting or maintaining measures
[of the type specified in Article 9.14].") with GATT, supra note 8, art. XX ("Subject to the
requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures [of the type specified in Article
XX].").
155. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 21.1(1) ("Article XX of the GATT 1994 and its interpretive
notes are incorporated into and made part of this Agreement, mutadis mutandis.").
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might legitimize an otherwise CAFTA-inconsistent measure.1 56 In
particular, Article 9.14(l)(b) contains an exception for measures
"necessary ... to protect plant life"' 57 and encompasses "necessary"
158
environmental measures.
CAFTA Article 9.14(l)(b) is identical to
59
XX(b).1
GATT Article
WTO tribunals have construed GATT Article XX(b) narrowly,
finding a measure to be "necessary" only if there exist no reasonably
available alternative measures that are either GATT-consistent or less
GATT-inconsistent. 160 One factor used to determine whether an
alternative is reasonably available is the extent to which the alternative
measure successfully realizes the end pursued.'16 Further, "the more vital
or important the common interests or values pursued," the
more likely
62
necessary.
is
end
that
achieve
to
designed
that a measure
Measures that are "necessary" under Article 9.14(1)(b) must further
comply with the chapeau of Article 9.14 in order to qualify for
exceptions to CAFTA's national treatment rules. 63 The purpose of the
chapeau is to minimize a member nation's ability to misuse exceptions
to substantive trade rules.' 64 Because panels will interpret the CAFTA
chapeau in the same way as the GATT chapeau, a measure that would
otherwise qualify for an exception violates the CAFTA Article 9.14
chapeau if it constitutes "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.' ' 65 For
a measure to violate the chapeau to GATT Article XX: (1) the measure
must discriminate on its face or in effect; (2) the discrimination must be

156. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 9.14(1) (listing exceptions for measures related to promoting
public morality; the environment; intellectual property; and goods and services related to
handicapped persons, prison labor, and philanthropic institutions).
157. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 9.14(l)(b).
158. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 9.14(2).
159. Compare CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 9.14(1)(b) ("necessary to protect human, animal, or
plant life or health") with GATT, supra note 8, art. XX(b) ("necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health").
160. See Report of the Panel, Thailand-Restrictionson Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes, 75, DS10/R (Nov. 7, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200, 223 (1991).
161, Appellate

Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting

Asbestos and

Asbestos-ContainingProducts, 172, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).
162. See id.
163. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, 157, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct.12, 1998) (discussing chapeau to equivalent WTO
exceptions).
164. See id. 160.
165. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 9.14(1).
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arbitrary or unjustifiable; and (3) either the discrimination must occur
between countries where substantially the same conditions prevail or
application of the measure must fail to consider the appropriateness of a
regulatory scheme for the conditions in the exporting country. 16 6 The
Appellate Body has found that a measure that technically complies with
an Article XX exception, but that amounts to arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination, constitutes a "disguised restriction on international
trade."' 167 The Appellate Body has found "unjustifiable discrimination"
where a nation's environmental standards fail to consider differing
conditions in foreign nations.' 68 WTO tribunals have also found
violations of the GATT Article XX chapeau where laws acted to coerce
other nations to adopt essentially the same regulatory scheme, 169 and
where a nation unilaterally devised a regulatory regime resulting in
discriminatory impacts
without first resorting to diplomacy with affected
70
nations.
member
B.

The CAFTA Annex Allows Laws PromotingEnvironmental Quality
Provided They Are Not DisguisedBarriersto Trade

The Annex extending CAFTA's coverage to certain U.S. states
provides the second potential source of environmental protection in
Article 9.171 In the Annex, the United States appended a set of exclusions
to its government procurement commitments. 172 The exclusion found in
Note 3 purports to allow state laws "that promote [a state's] general
environmental quality."' 173 Textually, the exception in the CAFTA
Annex clearly encompasses more types of measures than those
166. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, 150, 165, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
167. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, 4.9, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 20, 1996).
168. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products,
3-4, 165, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (discussing U.S. ban on shrimp
importation from nations that did not require vessels to use "turtle excluder devices" comparable in
effectiveness to those required under U.S. regulatory scheme, unless that nation's fishing
environment did not threaten incidental taking of protected sea turtle species).
169. See id. 161.
170. See id.
166-72; see also Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for
Reformulated and ConventionalGasoline, 4.17, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 20, 1996).
171. See CAFTA, supra note 6, Annex 9.1.2(b)(i).
172. See CAFTA U.S. Schedule Notes, supra note 12.
173. See CAFTA U.S. Schedule Notes, supra note 12. By contrast, the WTO does not authorize
an exception for measures "that promote the general environmental quality."
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"necessary ...to protect plant life" in CAFTA Article 9.14.174 However,
like the chapeau to Article 9.14, the Annex exclusion requires that a law
may not act as a "disguised barrier to international trade."' 175 Therefore,
regardless of its precise scope, the Annex exception remains strictly
limited because it does not allow environmentally-promotive
procurement measures that act as disguised "barriers" to international
trade. 176
V.

THE PROCUREMENT LAWS OF THREE STATES FAVOR
RECYCLED PAPER MADE OR RECOVERED LOCALLY

Fourteen of the states bound under CAFTA Article 9 have local
legislation mandating that state governmental agencies give preference
to recycled paper when procuring paper, 177 despite the ready availability
of low-cost virgin paper. 178 Of these states, only Washington used the
Annex to exempt paper products from the reach of CAFTA. 179 As a
result, the paper procurement laws of 18the
remaining thirteen states are
0
subject to the requirements of CAFTA.

174. Compare CAFTA U.S. Schedule Notes, supra note 12 with CAFTA, supra note 6, art.
9.14(1)(b). A law could "promote" environmental quality without being "necessary" to promote
environmental quality.
175. See CAFTA U.S. Schedule Notes, supra note 12.
176. Compare CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 9.14 ("Provided that such measures are not applied in a
manner that would constitute ... a disguised restriction on trade between the Parties ....) with
CAFTA U.S. Schedule Notes, supra note 12 ("Nothing in this Annex shall be construed to prevent
any state entity from applying restrictions that promote the general environmental quality in that
state, as long as such restrictions are not disguised barriers to international trade."). WTO panels use
the term "disguised restriction on international trade" interchangeably with the term "disguised
barrier to international trade" when discussing the chapeau of Article XX. See Panel Report,
Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain, 4.308,
WT/DS276/R (Apr. 6, 2004). The Article XX chapeau is nearly identical to the CAFTA Article 9.14
chapeau. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
177. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-11-260 (Supp. 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-103-207
(West 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 283.32 (West 2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-2349 (2000); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2415 (2000); MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 14-405 (LexisNexis
2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-1:65 (2000); N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 2878-a (McKinney 2002);

OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 279A.155 (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 37-2-76 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 5-23-22.4 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-56-406 (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 29,
§ 903 (Supp. 2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.19A.050 (2006).
178. See Rodney Young, Recovered Paper and the U.S. Solid Waste Dilemma, in SECONDARY
FIBER RECYCLING 1,3 (Richard J. Spangenberg ed., 1993).
179. See CAFTA U.S. Schedule, supra note 12.
180. See CAFTA U.S. Schedule, supra note 12.
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The procurement laws of the thirteen states fall into three different
categories. Type One laws allow a procurer to select a bidder using
recycled paper either made in-state or utilizing in-state waste even if the
lowest bid was submitted by a bidder using virgin paper.' 8' Type Two
laws either favor bids using recycled paper, wherever produced, over
lower bids using virgin paper or more generally favor recycled paper
''
when the price of recycled paper and virgin paper is "competitive. 82
Type Three laws simply establish minimum goals
for the percentage of
83
1
paper.
recycled
be
to
is
which
paper
purchased
This Comment examines Type One laws. 184 Arkansas requires
government procurers to purchase recycled paper if the use of the
products is technically feasible 85 and the price is within ten percent of
the lowest bid (i.e., a ten percent price preference).1 86 An additional one
percent preference is granted for products containing the largest amount
of post-consumer recycled materials recovered within Arkansas. 87 New
181. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-11-260; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2415; N.Y. PUB.AUTH. LAW
§ 2878-a.
182. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-103-207; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 283.32; IDAHO CODE ANN.

§ 67-2349; MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 14-405; UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-56-406.
183. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 21-1:65 (2000); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 279A.155 (West 2003);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 37-2-76 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 5-23-22.4 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 29,
§ 903 (Supp. 2005).
184. This Comment confines its analysis to Type One laws because the explicitly local
component of the discrimination in Type One laws inevitably will favor local recycled paper
products over their "like" foreign counterparts. See infra Part VI.A.3. Whether the facially neutral
Type Two and Three laws violate CAFTA's national treatment rules depends on whether a CAFTA
nation exports substantially more virgin paper than recycled paper. This factual inquiry is beyond
the scope of this paper.
In addition, facially neutral and consistently applied paper procurement laws generally are more
likely to pass the Article 9.14 chapeau's "smell" test. An inquiry into a chapeau violation is
inherently particularized, giving CAFTA panels wide latitude in deciding close cases. See Appellate
Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 159,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) ("The location of the line of equilibrium [between a member's
right to invoke GATT Article XX exceptions and other members' substantive GATT rights] is not
fixed and unchanging; the line moves as the kind and the shape of the measures at stake vary and as
the facts making up specific cases differ." (emphasis added)). Accordingly, this Comment leaves
open the question of whether Type Two and Three laws violate CAFTA.
185. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-11-260(c)(1). Historically, recycled paper possessed a generally
lower quality than virgin paper. See R.L. Ellis & K.M. Sedlachek, Recycled- Versus Virgin-Fiber
Characteristics: A Comparison, in SECONDARY FIBER RECYCLING, supra note 178, at 7, 7.
Advances in the processes by which recycled paper is produced have largely eliminated quality
concerns. See id.; see also R.C. Howard, The Effects of Recycling on Pulp Quality, in TECHNOLOGY
OF PAPER RECYCLING 181, 197 (R.W.J. McKinney ed., 1995).
186. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-11-260(c)(2)(A).
187. See id. § 19-11-260(c)(2)(B).
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York similarly requires procurers to purchase recycled products if their
cost is within ten percent of that of comparable products, and offers an
additional five percent price preference where at least fifty percent of the
secondary materials used in the manufacture of the product are generated
from the New York waste stream. 188 Finally, Louisiana grants a five
percent price preference for recycled products manufactured in
Louisiana. 189
VI. THE RECYCLED PAPER LAWS OF THREE STATES PLACE
THE UNITED STATES IN BREACH OF CAFTA
Type One laws-the pro-recycling procurement laws of Arkansas,
Louisiana, and New York-place the United States in breach of the
national treatment rules of CAFTA. Virgin paper is both "like" recycled
paper as well as directly competitive and substitutable with recycled
paper. 90 Yet, Type One laws treat foreign virgin and recycled paper less
favorably than local recycled paper. 19' The Article 9 "necessary"
exception and the
environmental exception in the Annex fail to justify
92
Type One laws. 1
A.

Type One Laws Violate CAFTA's National Treatment
Requirements

Type One recycled paper procurement laws violate CAFTA national
treatment rules. Recycled paper is both "like" and "directly substitutable
and competitive" with virgin paper. Despite this likeness, Type One laws
treat virgin paper less favorably than recycled paper.
1.

Recycled PaperIs "Like" Virgin Paper

The weight of the relevant factors indicates that recycled paper and
virgin paper are "like" products. 193 First, recycled paper and virgin paper
share the same properties, nature, and quality, a criterion concerned94
primarily with the physical similarities between two products.
188. See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 2878-a(1) (McKinney 2002).
189. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2415 (2000).

190. See infra Part VI.A.1-2.
191. See infra Part VI.A.3.

192. See infra Part VI.B.
193. See supra Part III.A.1.

194. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and
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Physically, recycled paper and virgin paper are identical, save for the
fact that one contains already-used paper. 95 While recycled paper has
historically possessed a somewhat lower quality 96 and uses a different
manufacturing process, the quality of recycled paper is largely
97
influenced by events that take place prior to recycling processes.
Properly treated, most recycled paper is virtually indistinguishable from
virgin paper. 18
The second and third factors of "end uses" and "consumer tastes and
habits" also favor a finding of "likeness."' 199 Recycled paper and virgin
paper share precisely the same end uses.2 °° Moreover, recycled paper
products are intended to take the place of virgin paper products-they
serve the same functions while leaving a smaller environmental
footprint. 20 ' Nevertheless, the fact that recycled paper and virgin paper
are produced differently is irrelevant to the inquiry of "likeness" because
WTO jurisprudence rejects distinguishing goods based on how they are
made, harvested, or produced.20 2 In addition, consumers are increasingly
willing to use recycled paper products instead of their virgin paper
counterparts.20 3
Tariff classification, the final factor considered in trade jurisprudence,
also supports a finding of "likeness. 20 4 Scrap and waste paper is
Asbestos-ContainingProducts, 110, WTIDS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001); see also supra notes 12628 and accompanying text.
195. See Ellis & Sedlachek, supra note 185, at 7 ("The apparent deficiency of recycled fiber can
be overcome by refining or by the addition of chemicals to the papermaking process.").
196. See Ellis & Sedlachek, supra note 185, at 7.
197. See Howard, supra note 185, at 195.
198. See Ellis & Sedlachek, supra note 185, at 7 ("The apparent deficiency of recycled fiber can
be overcome by refining or by the addition of chemicals to the papermaking process.").
199. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
200. See, e.g., Young, supra note 178, at 2 (discussing use of recycled paper in tissue, newsprint,
and paperboard).
201. See Young, supra note 178, at I (discussing United State's drive to increase the use of
recycled paper to counter solid-waste disposal concerns).
202. See supra Part III.A.2.
203. See U.S. FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES ON
THE CRITERIA AND INDICATORS

FOR THE SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF TEMPERATE AND

BOREAL FORESTS 7-10 (1997), http://www.fs.fed.us/global/pub/links/report/contents.htm (follow
"Chapter 7 Criterion 6: Socio-Economic Benefits" hyperlink). Studies have even found that
consumers may be willing to pay more for recycled paper products than their virgin paper
equivalents. See, e.g., Gregory A. Guagnano, Altruism and Market-Like Behavior. An Analysis of
Willingness to Payfor Recycled Paper Products,22 POPULATION & ENV'T 425, 433 (2001) (finding
that consumers are willing to pay more for paper towels incorporating recycled paper).
204. See supranotes 132-33 and accompanying text.
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classified differently from finished paper products.20 5 However, paper
products containing recycled paper and paper products containing virgin
paper are given the same tariff classification.2 °6
2.

Even Assuming Recycled PaperIs Not "Like " Virgin Paper,the
Two Products Are Directly Substitutable and Competitive

Even if recycled paper is not "like" virgin paper, it is directly
substitutable and competitive with virgin paper. Despite the ample
supply of low-cost virgin fiber,207 consumption of recycled paper has
continued to expand in the United States since the passage of
procurement laws favoring recycled paper.20 8 This suggests that virgin
paper and recycled paper are directly substitutable and competitive. 20 9 If
so, and if the price distortions created by Type One procurement laws
were eliminated, the demand for virgin paper would rise. 210 Evidence of
such price elasticity strongly suggests that products are directly
competitive and substitutable.21'
States have also demonstrated through the structure of their
procurement laws that they consider recycled paper and virgin paper to
be interchangeable products that offer alternative ways of satisfying the
same need.2 1 Many state recycled paper procurement laws only
authorize the procuring entity to buy recycled paper when it is costeffective to do so. 2 13 If recycled paper is too expensive, even Type One
'"o

205. Compare U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, ch. 47
(2006) (containing classifications of waste and scrap paper) with id., ch. 48 (2006) (classifying
finished paper products).
206. See id., ch. 48 (2006). Chapter 48 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule does not differentiate
between recycled paper products and virgin paper products. See, e.g., U.S. Customs Ruling Ltr. NY
811441 (June 16, 1995), http://rulings.customs.gov/index.asp?ru=811441&qu=NY+811441&vw
=detail (classifying stationery kit containing solely recycled paper under Heading 4817.30.0000 of
the Harmonized Tariff Schedule).
207. See Young, supra note 178, at 2, 3.
208. See AMERICAN FOREST AND PAPER Ass'N, RECOVERED PAPER STATISTICAL HIGHLIGHTS 5
(2005), http://www.paperrecycles.org/news/print_materials/2005-StatHighlights.pdf.
209. See Panel Report, Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 7.24, WT/DS87/R (June 15,
1999) ("[P]anels should look at evidence of trends and changes in consumption patterns and make
an assessment as to whether such trends and patterns lead to the conclusion that the products in
question are ... directly competitive or substitutable ....

").

210. Cf id. 17.43 (discussing a study showing consumers' price-dependent decision to try
imported spirits instead of domestic spirits as their prices converged).
211. See id. 7.77-78.
212. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-11-260(c)(1) (Supp. 2005) ("Whenever a bid is required, a
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states will simply buy virgin paper products; price drives the decision,
not function.21 4 Because the deciding factor in Type One laws is
economic, such laws implicitly recognize that recycled paper and virgin
paper products possess the same end uses.21 5
3.

Type One Laws Treat Foreign ProductsLess Favorably Than
Domestic Products

Type One laws violate CAFTA because such laws treat local recycled
paper more favorably than "like" foreign paper. Type One laws not only
favor recycled paper over virgin paper, but further favor products that
are either made intrastate21 6 or use waste materials recovered
intrastate.21 7 These provisions systematically favor local business over
foreign competition; such favoritism is the essence of a national
treatment violation.2' 8
B.

Type One Laws Do Not Qualify Under the Two Relevant CAFTA
EnvironmentalExceptions

Type One laws do not qualify for protection under either the CAFTA
exception for measures "necessary ... to protect plant life '2 19 or the
CAFTA exception for promoting "the general environmental quality" in
a state. 220 Recycled paper procurement laws are not "necessary" in the
relevant sense. 221 But even if "necessary," such laws nonetheless
constitute an unjustifiable restriction on international trade in violation
of the chapeau to CAFTA Article 9.222 For the same reason, Type One

preference for recycled paper products shall be exercised if the use of the products is technically
feasible and price is competitive.").
214. See id. § 19-11-260; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2415 (2000).
215. See supra Part VI.A. 1.
216. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2415.
217. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-11-260(c)(2)(B); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2415; N.Y. PUB.

AUTH. LAW § 2878-a (MeKinney 2002).
218. See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,

6.3, WT/DS8/R (July

11, 1996) ("The broad and fundamental purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism in the
application of internal tax and regulatory measures.").
219. See CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 9.14(l)(b).
220. See CAFTA U.S. Schedule Notes, supra note 12.
221. See infra Part VI.B.1.
222. See infra Part VI.B.3.
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be justified under the "general environmental quality"
laws also cannot
223
exception.
1.

The EnvironmentalException for Measures "Necessary... To
ProtectPlant Life " Does Not Apply to Type One Laws

CAFTA Article 9.14(1)(b) does not protect Type One laws, even
though it explicitly includes "environmental measures necessary to
protect human, animal, or plant life or health. 224 Recycled paper
procurement laws are not "necessary" in the sense of Article 9.14(1)(b).
By analogy to GATT Article XX(b), a measure is "necessary" only if
there are no reasonably available alternative measures that are either
CAFTA-consistent or less CAFTA-inconsistent.225 For example, in
Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes,226 a panel found that an import ban on cigarettes was not
"necessary" because, inter alia, Thailand could reduce cigarette usage by
banning tobacco advertising, raising the price of cigarettes, or applying
strict labeling requirements.227
Likewise, Type One laws are not "necessary" if states can meet their
pro-environmental objectives by establishing maximum caps on the
amount of paper bought by a state agency per year, instituting and
enforcing office protocols to reduce paper use, or encouraging or
requiring recycling by the public at large, among other options. Such
because
measures are reasonably available, and are CAFTA-consistent228
paper.
domestic
as
favorably
as
paper
imported
treat
would
they
2.

The EnvironmentalExceptionfor Laws that "Promotethe General
Environmental Quality" Does Not Protect Type One Laws

The CAFTA Annex provides the second potential source of
environmental protection, but also fails to protect Type One laws. Note 3
of the Annex allows measures that promote the general environmental

223. See infra Part VI.B.2.
224. CAFTA, supra note 6, art. 9.14(2).
225. Report of the Panel, Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on
Cigarettes, 75, DSI0/R (Nov. 7, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1990) (discussing
identical WTO exception); see also supra Part IV.A.
226. Report of the Panel, DS10/R (Nov. 7, 1990), GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1990).
227. See id. 77-79, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200.
228. See GATT, supranote 8, art. III 4.
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quality in a state. 229 Type One laws do "promote the general
environmental quality" in the states at issue because removing material
from the waste stream to a recycling plant benefits the environment.2 30
Unlike Article 9.14, the Annex contains no requirement of necessity.2 31
However, the availability of this exception remains subject to the
requirement that a measure must not act as a disguised barrier to
international trade.23 2 While recycled paper preferences would qualify as
measures that promote the general environmental quality of a state, they
do act as disguised barriers to international trade.233
3.

The DisparateTreatment of Recycled Paperand Virgin Paper
Fails Under the Chapeau to Article 9.14 and the Equivalent Annex
Provision

Type One recycled paper procurement laws also fail the chapeau to
Article 9.14 because they constitute arbitrary and unjustifiable
restrictions on international trade, and act as a disguised barrier to
international trade. 34 Type One laws have an impermissibly coercive
effect on the policy decisions of CAFTA members.2 35 Without
developing a recycled paper industry capable of export, CAFTA
members find their likelihood of state procurement bidding success
curtailed because their ability to export paper to Type One states
depends largely on their use of recycled paper. 236 However, a CAFTA
member cannot seek to achieve a policy goal by using a regulatory

229. CAFTA U.S. Schedule Notes, supra note 12.

230. See Young, supra note 178, at I (noting "crisis" of limited landfill capacity in the United
States).
231. Compare CAFTA U.S. Schedule Notes, supra note 12 with CAFTA, supra note 6, art.

9.14(l)(b).
232. See CAYTA U.S. Schedule Notes, supra note 12.
233. See infra Part VI.B.3.
234. See supra Part IV.
235. Compare, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-11-260(c)(1) (allowing procurers to favor recycled
paper when "technically feasible") with Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 164, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (discussing U.S.

measure that coerced WTO members to "adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory
program").
236. For example, the Arkansas state government is allowed to purchase local recycled paper
even if it costs ten to eleven percent more than virgin paper from El Salvador. See ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 19-11-260(c).
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scheme that requires other members to adopt essentially the same
scheme.237
For the same reason, Type One laws cannot be justified under the
Annex. Whether a CAFTA nation can export paper to a Type One state
depends on whether the nation establishes a recycled paper industry
capable of meeting the target state's technical specifications. 238 An
attempt to coerce other nations to adopt essentially the same scheme
constitutes a disguised restriction on international trade.239
VII. CONCLUSION
Type One recycled paper procurement preferences violate the national
treatment provisions of Article 9 of CAFTA, and fail to meet either of
the limited environmental exceptions of CAFTA. In order to comply
with CAFTA, the federal government, through negotiation or
preemption, must ensure that state laws comply with CAFTA
requirements. Creation of a Federal-State International Trade Policy
Commission to coordinate communication between federal and state
trade policy officials, as requested by the Washington State Senate, may
prove a good place to start.

237. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, 164, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
238. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 19-11-260(c)(1).
239. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, 164, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
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